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Entrepreneurship in the East German Transition 
Process: Lessons for the Korean Peninsula 
Michael Fritsch & Michael Wyrwich ∗ 
Abstract: »Unternehmerische Selbständigkeit im ostdeutschen Transformati-
onsprozess und Implikationen für Korea«. This paper summarizes the role of 
entrepreneurship in the East German transformation process that followed the 
breakdown of the socialist regime and subsequent unification with West Ger-
many. The main aim of this exercise is to derive conclusions and recommenda-
tions for a potential unification of the Korean Peninsula. We demonstrate that 
the formation of new businesses played a significant role, while efforts to 
adapt formerly state-owned firms were much less successful. In East Germany, 
newly emerging firms created the major share of employment opportunities, 
while incumbent socialist firms shed vast amounts of labor or disappeared 
completely. The main implication for a potential unification of the Korean Pen-
insula is that policy should have a special focus on entrepreneurship. In par-
ticular, it should try to utilize and strengthen the entrepreneurial abilities of 
the North Korean population and to create favorable conditions for the emer-
gence of prospering new businesses. 
Keywords: Entrepreneurship, transformation, East Germany, Korea. 
1.  Aims and Scope1 
Theory, as well as empirical evidence, suggests that entrepreneurship is a key 
driver of development.2 This may particularly hold true for disruptive changes of 
the institutional framework like the shock transformation of the East German 
economy from a socialist system to a market economy (Brezinski and Fritsch 
1995). While the socialist regime of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) 
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made great efforts to make private firms3 go extinct, the sudden freedom to set 
up an own business has led to a start-up boom. After a number of years, self-
employment in East Germany reached and then exceeded the West German level. 
This paper summarizes the role of entrepreneurship in the East German 
transformation process that followed the breakdown of the socialist regime and 
subsequent unification with West Germany. The main aim of this exercise is to 
derive conclusions and recommendations for a potential unification of the 
Korean Peninsula.4 We demonstrate that new business formation – “bottom-
up” transformation – has played a rather significant role, while “top-down” 
transformation, i.e., the adaptation of the formerly state-owned firms to the new 
framework conditions, was much less successful. In the transformation process 
of East Germany, newly emerging firms created the bulk share of jobs, while 
incumbent socialist firms shed vast amounts of labor or they disappeared com-
pletely. The main implication for a potential unification of the Korean Peninsu-
la is that policy should have a strong focus on entrepreneurship. In particular, it 
should try to utilize and strengthen the entrepreneurial abilities and initiatives 
of the North Korean population and to create favorable conditions for the 
emergence of prospering new businesses.  
Section 2 offers an overview of the challenges that incumbent socialist en-
terprises faced during the transition to a market economy and document the 
development of these firms over the course of the transition. Section 3 deals 
with the development of entrepreneurship in East Germany since the fall of the 
Berlin Wall in the year 1989. In particular, we analyze the individual character-
istics of the new East German entrepreneurs as well as reasons for the consid-
erable differences in new business formation that can be observed. Based on 
the empirical evidence of the East German case we then discuss implications 
for a potential unification of the two Koreas in section 4. Section 5 summarizes 
our main arguments and draws conclusions. 
2. The Shock Transformation and its Effects on Socialist 
Enterprises 
2.1 The Transition Shock in Detail 
The East German transition process to a western-type market economy system 
was marked by three main steps (for details see Brezinski and Fritsch 1995): 
                                                             
3  There were manifold attempts by the socialist regime to eradicate and crowd out entrepre-
neurial initiative and self-employment. The few remaining self-employed people were 
heavily regulated (Pickel 1992; Thomas 1996). 
4  Our particular focus on firm demography complements previous work on implications of the 
German re-unification process for the Korean Peninsula (Henke 2014). 
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- Increased competition due to the opening of the border in November 
1989. 
- Currency union between East and West Germany introduced on July 1, 
1990. 
- An abrupt change of the formal institutional framework that came with 
German unification on October 3, 1990. 
It is quite likely that these three stages will also play an important role in the 
potential case of a unification of the Korean Peninsula (see Section 4). 
2.1.1  Competition Shock and Currency Union 
One of the key challenges for incumbent East German enterprises began with 
the opening of the inner German border in November 1989. Suddenly, East 
German firms that were used to a comfortable position of serving seller’s mar-
kets found themselves in direct competition with a diversified supply of high 
quality products from Western firms that attracted considerable demand of the 
population. Since GDR labor productivity was only about 30 percent of the West 
German level (Mallok 1996; van Ark 1995), East German firms could only re-
main competitive with much lower wages. Another severe problem was that most 
of the East German firms’ products were of comparatively low quality and ap-
peared outdated. Hence, significant product innovation became a key issue.  
The competition with Western firms became particularly intensive in the af-
termath of the currency union that was introduced on July 1, 1990. Due to the 
chosen exchange rate of 1:1 between the East and West German Mark, along 
with generous collective labor agreements, East German wages rose between 
1989 and 1990 by about 500 percent (wage shock) (Sinn and Sinn 1992). The 
wage level increased in subsequent years while labor productivity did not rise at 
a corresponding rate. As a consequence, East German firms were hardly com-
petitive resulting in a massive employment decline. This development was 
accompanied by a sharp reduction in demand of often long-term customers 
from other former socialist countries that could hardly afford East German 
products anymore because the German currency union implied a drastic change 
of the terms of trade. Many former customers substituted East German products 
with cheaper ones that were now freely available on the world market. 
Another important challenge for East German firms was the increased avail-
ability of raw materials and intermediate goods that created a supply shock 
(Brezinski and Fritsch 1995). Most firms in the centrally planned socialist 
economy had a rather high degree of vertical integration in order to be less 
vulnerable to shortfalls of supply and misallocations. With the introduction of 
the market economy many internal stages of production became unprofitable 
since intermediate goods of often considerably higher quality could be bought 
much cheaper on the market. The improved availability of inputs induced a 
sharp decrease of the vertical integration leading to further employment losses. 
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At the same time, introduction of modern and more efficient production tech-
nologies further reduced the demand for labor (for details, see Mallok 1996). 
Finally, East German firms played a relatively minor role in the national in-
novation system. Similar to most socialist countries, basic research and the 
largest part of applied research and development (R&D) were conducted in 
National Academies of Science and in the universities. As a consequence, 
many socialist firms had a rather low absorptive capacity and were often quite 
hesitant to adopt the research results of these external institutions. Another 
reason for the relatively low level of R&D in East German firms was the East 
German policy that emphasized reconstructing heavy industries directly after 
World War II, a task that did not require much scientific input. Later on, the 
demand for innovative products remained relatively low since most efforts 
were focused on meeting actual production plans in the face of growing inter-
national isolation and constantly decreasing competitiveness (for further de-
tails, see Mayntz 1998). 
2.1.2  The Abrupt Change of the Formal Institutional Framework 
German reunification occurred on October 3, 1990, and was accompanied by 
the complete transfer to East Germany of the ready-made formal institutional 
framework of the West German state, the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). 
This shock-like institutional transition constitutes the main difference between 
German reunification and the developments in other former socialist East Eu-
ropean countries where changes took place much more gradually (Hall and 
Ludwig 1995; Brezinski and Fritsch 1995). Since many of the new laws and 
regulations were entirely different from those of the socialist GDR, adapting to 
the new “rules of the game” was an enormous challenge for the people and 
firms of East Germany. The adoption of the West German institutional frame-
work included a rather significant reorganization of the innovation system, 
particularly in the field of public research (for details, see Guenther 2014). 
All these developments of the transition process implied a severe mental 
shock for the East German population. The new system required a much higher 
level of self-initiative and flexibility. Under the new conditions, many of the 
organizational routines and structures that enterprises had developed under the 
socialist regime became obsolete if not detrimental. Even qualifications, work 
experience and knowledge that had been acquired by members of the work-
force in the old system, became obsolete and were of much less economic 
value (see also Bird et al. 1994; Gathmann 2005; Hitchens, Wagner and Birnie 
1992; Wyrwich 2013). Therefore, adapting existing structures, developing new 
routines and acquiring new job skills was one of the key challenges for former 
socialist enterprises and its labor force (for details, see Fritsch and Mallok 
1998; Newman 2000).  
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2.2  How Policy Tried to Assist 
New policy measures were created in an effort to support firms in coping with 
the enormous challenges of the transformation process. One main focus was the 
conversion of state-owned firms (that comprised the vast majority of employ-
ees) into private ones. The restructuring and privatization of the state-owned 
companies was carried out by a privatization agency (THA, Treuhandanstalt), 
which was created by the government in March 1990 approximately six months 
before reunification (for details regarding the organizational structure of the 
THA, see Seibel 2005). The THA became the owner of all previously state-
owned companies consisting of about 8,000 firms with more than 45,000 
establishments in total. In the course of restructuring procedures the number 
of firms grew to ca. 14,600. The main strategy of the THA was rapidly re-
structuring and selling their firm portfolio to private investors who had to 
develop restructuring and investment plans for the acquired firms. The THA 
was dissolved by the end of 1994. Around this time, the bulk share of firms 
was either closed down or sold to West German and international investors. 
Only 20 percent of the firms were privatized via management buy-outs (MBO) 
through executive employees.5 
With the German unification on October 3, 1990, East Germany automati-
cally became a member of the European Union and was therefore eligible for 
regional assistance. Main instruments of regional policy for firms at that time 
were investment subsidies that enabled them to modernize their equipment. 
While some observers expected that the implementation of up-to-date machin-
ery would more or less automatically enable East German firms to catch up 
with the West German productivity level (Sinn and Sinn 1992), the effect of a 
modernized capital stock turned out to be much less pronounced (Mallok 1996; 
Fritsch and Mallok 2002). A main bottleneck for a catch-up of East German 
firms that could not be tackled with investment subsidies was management 
know-how, particularly with regard to selecting and using modern machinery 
in a way that it unfolds its productivity. Other main fields of supporting poli-
cies were the reconstruction and modernization of the physical infrastructure 
that the socialist regime had left in rather bad shape, as well as the transfor-
mation of the education and research sector and its integration into the innova-
tion system of the re-united Germany.  
It is rather remarkable that new business formation was not a focus of policy 
in the early years of the transition process. Significant policy attempts to stimu-
late and support the emergence of new businesses in Germany, and East Ger-
many in particular, emerged only after the year 2000. 
                                                             
5  For details, see Leysen (1991), Brezinski (1992), Sinn and Sinn (1992), Carlin (1993), Brücker 
(1995), Sander (1995), and MacLean et al. (2003). 
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2.3  The Development of Incumbent Enterprises over the Course of 
Transition 
Due to the developments described above, the industrial output of the East 
German economy in the year 1991 was only about 35 percent of the initial level 
of 1989 (Hall and Ludwig 1995). Burda and Hunt (2001) characterize the de-
velopment of the East German economy in the early 1990s as the most severe 
economic dislocation in peace time in the 20th century. The unemployment 
rate, that was virtually zero in 1989, grew to 15 percent in the year 1992. The 
bulk share of former socialist enterprises was unable to cope with new chal-
lenges and had to be closed down, others were split up and privatized. After a 
few years, the employment share of these firms was rather minor (Brücker 
1995; Bellmann et al. 2003; Wahse et al. 1995). Despite the high investment of 
public subsidies in modern production facilities and equipment, productivity 
growth of the East German economy was rather moderate (for details see 
Mallok 1996). Even more than two decades after the fall of the Berlin Wall 
there is still a pronounced East-West German productivity gap of about 25-30 
percent (IWH 2010; Mattes et al. 2015). 
The experience of the East German transition process demonstrates that the 
opportunities for a successful “top-down” transformation are somewhat lim-
ited. One might argue that the relatively poor performance of top-down trans-
formation in East Germany might be due to the shock-like character of the 
transition process. However, incumbent enterprises in those East European 
countries that transformed more gradually did not perform significantly better 
after the dissolution of socialism. In those countries, slow privatization and, 
particularly, an inappropriate framework of formal institutions turned out to be 
a severe impediment to a fast recovery.6 
Against this background, one can expect that attempts to transform state-
owned enterprises in North Korea will face massive problems as well, and 
might have only rather limited success. Therefore, using a bottom-up approach 
for the transition process, namely encouraging the emergence of new firms, is 
likely to meet with greater success.  
                                                             
6  For details see Myant and Drahokoupil (2011) and the contributions in Aslund and Djankov 
(2014). 
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3.  Entrepreneurship and New Business Formation in the 
East German Transition Process 
3.1  Self-Employment in the GDR and after Reunification 
At the advent of the GDR regime in September 1989 there were around 
185,000 self-employed persons in East Germany including helping family 
members. The self-employment rate was about 1.8 percent among the working 
age population (18 to 65 years). Around the same time, the self-employment 
rate in West Germany was about 10 percent (Figure 1).7 Self-employment was 
restricted to a few sectors and was heavily regulated. Most of the business 
owners were active in handicrafts and manufacturing trades (e.g., bakers, 
butchers, car repair) or were free professionals (e.g., medical doctors) (for 
details, see Pickel 1992). 




In the course of the transition process, the framework conditions for entrepre-
neurship and the incentives for becoming self-employed changed tremendous-
ly. Particularly, the switch to the institutions of a modern western-type market 
economy in East Germany implied a massive start-up boom (Fritsch et al. 
                                                             
7  Own calculations based on the German micro census (for details, see Fritsch, Kritikos and 
Rusakova 2012). 
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2014). One of the explanations for this surge in entrepreneurship was the enor-
mous backlog of demand for high-quality products and for services that were in 
short supply under the socialist planned economy. The low number of suppliers 
in East Germany created a “window of opportunity” for starting a firm, which is 
also reflected in relatively high survival chances and growth rates of firms that 
were founded in the early 1990s (e.g., Brixy and Kohaut 1999; Almus 2002; 
Fritsch 2004). A further explanation for the rise of start-up activity is that self-
employment became an alternative to unemployment which rose rapidly in the 
aftermath of transition. Last but not least, massive public investments in infra-
structure induced a particularly large number of new businesses in the con-
struction industries during these years (e.g., Bellmann et al. 2003). 
East German start-ups in the early stage of the transition process faced a 
broad range of special impediments. Due to low incomes in the socialist GDR 
regime and low incentives for savings, founders had little equity. Another 
problem was that unclear ownership of land and buildings led to shortages in 
the availability of floor space. Moreover, the functioning and efficiency of the 
public administration was rather limited due to fundamental restructuring and 
the implementation of new routines. Last but not least, social acceptance of 
entrepreneurs tended to be considerably lower than in the West (Thomas 1996).  
The level of firm dynamics as reflected by the level of market entries and 
exits decreased over the course of the 1990s. Nevertheless, the level of self-
employment rose steadily, approaching the West German level around the year 
2004 and thereafter exceeding this level (Figure 1). 
3.2  How to Explain the Increase of Entrepreneurship in East 
Germany? 
Given the more than four decades of a socialist regime with its massive anti-
entrepreneurial policy and indoctrination of the population, the rise of self-
employment in East Germany to the West German level within just a few years 
is quite remarkable. Having lived under a socialist regime, most GDR citizens 
had nearly no experience with a market economy and lacked knowledge of how 
to run an entrepreneurial venture. Furthermore, GDR propaganda had con-
demned entrepreneurship as a bourgeois anachronism and in that way triggered 
a mentality at odds with entrepreneurship. 
One explanation for the swift re-emergence of self-employment in East 
Germany can be based on William Baumol’s (1990) hypothesis that the share 
of entrepreneurial people in a country is quite constant over time independent 
of the institutional regime and the economic system. However, the way in 
which entrepreneurial talent is applied may considerably differ according to the 
institutional context. Baumol (1990) argues that the way people make use of 
their entrepreneurial talent is strongly shaped by the ruling institutions, the 
“rules of the game,” as well as the prevailing norms and values (North 1994). 
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He classifies self-employment as an economically “productive” form of entre-
preneurship, while other forms of entrepreneurial behavior such as rent-seeking 
activities, tax evasion and crime are rather “unproductive” or even “destruc-
tive.” This means that in a socialist system that makes strong efforts to suppress 
private sector economic activity, the same people that would be self-employed 
in a market economy may find it more rewarding to use their entrepreneurial 
talent by acting as managers of socialist enterprises, by engagement in socialist 
mass organizations or in black market activity. Accordingly, the start-up boom 
in East Germany could be explained by the fact that it is much easier for entre-
preneurial people to unfold their abilities and ambitions by starting their own 
business in a market economy than under socialism.  
Support for Baumol’s hypothesis is also provided by examples from other 
East European countries where many people that had leading positions in so-
cialist firms and organizations started an own business when the system devel-
oped towards a market economy (e.g., Hisrich and Grachev 1993; Rona-Tas 
1994; Stoica 2004). Self-employment might have been a viable career option 
for these people in socialism if the institutional framework conditions would 
have been more favorable for self-employment. However, under a socialist 
regime it was more rewarding to act out one’s entrepreneurial talent through 
rent-seeking in leading positions of socialist mass organizations. Thus, the 
observed empirical patterns confirm Baumol’s hypothesis that institutions 
determine how people make use of their entrepreneurial talent. Hisrich and 
Grachev (1993) vividly demonstrate that in the Soviet Union a considerable 
level of entrepreneurial talent existed and could only be applied in the shadow 
economy because private firms were illegal. 
An implication of Baumol’s hypothesis is that self-employed people in East 
and West Germany should have quite similar characteristics. Empirical anal-
yses of East and West German entrepreneurs show that they are indeed rather 
comparable with regard to age, gender, educational attainments as well as 
personality traits (for details see Fritsch et al. 2014). An East German peculiari-
ty is the lower prevalence of entrepreneurship among older people. This can be 
explained by a comparatively stronger effect of the policies of the socialist 
regime on the perception of entrepreneurship for those people that had experi-
enced this anti-entrepreneurial environment for a relatively long period of time. 
Moreover, it can be assumed that people with a relatively long period of work 
experience in the socialist system faced a particularly strong devaluation of 
their acquired knowledge under the new framework conditions and that this 
work experience was of little help for recognizing and pursuing entrepreneurial 
opportunities (Wyrwich 2013; Wyrwich et al. 2016).8 
                                                             
8  Occupational and industrial experience are key determinants for the detection of entrepre-
neurial opportunities.  
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A main difference between East and West German businesses, even more 
than two decades after the unification, is that East German firms tend to be of a 
considerably smaller size. Large firms are rather rare and quite a number of 
East German establishments are subsidiaries of West German or international 
companies. An obvious reason for the on average smaller size of East German 
firms is that many of them are not very competitive, which is reflected in their 
comparatively low level of productivity and lower chances of survival (Fackler 
2014). Possible explanations for this weakness of East German firms are unfa-
vorable economic framework conditions, as well as a lack of managerial and 
entrepreneurial skills among East German founders. In this respect, Wyrwich 
(2010) shows that the likelihood of achieving growth is higher among those East 
German firms where West German co-founders play a significant role. Further-
more, East German firms tend to have a stronger focus on regional markets while 
their export orientation is relatively low (IWH 2010; Mattes et al. 2015). 
3.3  Regional Differences of Start-Up Activity in East Germany 
after Transition 
There is significant spatial variation in the level of new business formation and 
self-employment in East Germany. Relatively high start-up rates are found in 
the regions adjacent to Berlin, in the broader areas of other larger cities like 
Dresden, Chemnitz, Leipzig, Magdeburg and Rostock, as well as in a stripe that 
connects the main cities of Thuringia including Erfurt and Jena (Figure 2). 
Start-up rates have been relatively low in many rural areas and in those places 
that have been heavily shaped by socialist economic policies like Hoyerswerda 
(heavy investments in lignite-coal mining and energy) and Bitterfeld (concen-
tration of the chemical industry). The coastal regions of East Germany had 
relatively high levels of new firm formation in the tourism industry.  
An important finding of our empirical analyses is a strong persistence of re-
gional differences of entrepreneurship over time. There is a significant positive 
relationship between current levels of new business formation and the share of 
self-employed people in the mid-1920s, as well as with the share of self-
employed just before the fall of the Berlin Wall (for details, see Wyrwich 2012; 
Fritsch and Wyrwich 2014). Regions with a pre-socialist entrepreneurial tradi-
tion are those with relatively strong remnants of self-employment during the 
socialist regime. Entrepreneurial tradition also has a positive effect on the level 
of start-up activity after transition. Altogether, regional differences in start-up 
activity show a considerable level of path-dependence that could not be com-
pletely destroyed by the anti-entrepreneurial socialist policies.9 It is important 
to notice that regions with an entrepreneurial tradition in pre-socialist times 
                                                             
9  There is also persistence of spatial differences in start-up activity in West Germany (Fritsch 
and Wyrwich 2014). 
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were apparently well able to cope with the challenges of the transition process 
showing relatively high levels of GDP growth (Kawka 2007). A similar pattern 
can be found in West Germany where historically high levels of self-
employment are positively related to economic growth in recent periods 
(Fritsch and Wyrwich 2016). 
Figure 2: Average Number of Start-Ups between 1990 und 2008 per 1,000 
Inhabitants Aged between 18 and 64 Years 
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The persistence of new business formation and self-employment suggests the 
prevalence of a regionally embedded culture of entrepreneurship that survived 
severe historical shocks like World War II, forty years of an anti-
entrepreneurial socialist system, and the regime switch to a market economy 
(Fritsch et al. 2014; Fritsch and Wyrwich 2014). Entrepreneurial culture can be 
understood as an orientation of the population toward entrepreneurial values 
such as individualism, independence and achievement (e.g., McClelland 1961; 
Hofstede and McCrae 2008). It is marked by norms and values in favor of 
entrepreneurship as well as by high legitimacy and social acceptance of entre-
preneurial behavior (e.g., Etzioni 1987; Kibler et al. 2014).  
The evidence of the German case strongly suggests that an entrepreneurial 
culture is conducive to economic growth and constitutes an important regional 
asset in coping with the problems of economic transition. Altogether, the find-
ings are in line with the prominent hypothesis advocated by institutional econ-
omists that informal institutions such as norms, codes of behavior, and culture 
are much more persistent over time than formal institutions, which may change 
overnight as observed in the case of German re-unification (North 1994; Wil-
liamson 2000). 
3.4  Preliminary Conclusions 
There is compelling evidence that institutional framework conditions play a 
crucial role in determining the level of productive entrepreneurship, such as 
start-up activity. Further important factors that are conducive to successful self-
employment are the experiences and skills of the local population, as well as 
the prevalence of a regional entrepreneurship culture. There are remarkable 
similarities with respect to individual characteristics of firm founders in East 
and West Germany, but also a number of differences that can be explained by 
the socialist legacy of East Germany. Despite these differences, the average 
level of self-employment in East Germany reached the level of the western part 
of the country in a relatively short period of time while significant regional 
differences within both East and West Germany persist.  
4.  Implications of the East German Experience for the 
Korean Context 
4.1  Basic Trends of Firm Demography 
The East German transition process that began in the years 1989/90 was 
marked by three basic trends: 
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- Most of the former socialist state-owned enterprises were unable to cope 
with the challenges of transition and had to sharply reduce employment 
or were closed down. 
- Newly founded firms played a key role in the transition process and con-
tributed positively to economic development. 
- Many East German founders as well as managers of incumbent enterpris-
es already had leading positions in the socialist system. 
Based on this evidence, we expect that these trends will also play a crucial role 
in the case of a potential unification of North and South Korea. New business 
formation will likely play an important role since North Korean incumbent 
firms will probably face even more severe difficulties in coping with the chal-
lenges of transition than those faced by the state-owned companies during the 
transition process in East Germany. The inability of socialist firms to cope with 
the transition to a market economy also holds true for other East European 
countries where the changes occurred much less rapidly than in the former 
GDR (Djankov 2014; Myant and Drahokoupi, 2011). Although the available 
information about the industrial structure and the productivity of the North 
Korean economy are relatively sparse (for an overview about regional industri-
al structures, see Dormels 2015), it is quite likely that the productivity gap 
between North and South Korea today is considerably larger than the backlog 
of East German firms in 1989/90. Compared to other East European countries, 
productivity of the GDR economy was, indeed, relatively high.10 
If there is a unification of the Korean Peninsula, North Korean firms would 
need to modernize their product portfolio and production technologies tremen-
dously in order to cope with the challenges of market integration. Since most of 
the capital stock of North Korean firms is deteriorated and obsolete, heavy 
investment into modern machinery and equipment is clearly warranted. How-
ever, the East German experience clearly shows that financial subsidies for 
investment in new machinery are insufficient for creating a significant increase 
in productivity (Fritsch and Mallok 2002). It is perhaps even more important to 
draw on external expertise when implementing new machinery and production 
                                                             
10  It is quite interesting that West German experts overestimated the situation in the East 
German economy in the late 1980s despite a relative abundance of data. The German Insti-
tute for Economics Research (DIW), for example, estimated that the productivity of the GDR 
economy was about ca. 45 to 55 percent of the West German level (Görzig and Gornig 
1991), while van Ark (1995, 1997) estimations based on information of East German Statis-
tical Offices yielded a productivity level of about 30 percent. There is no internationally 
comparable data available on labor productivity for other Eastern European countries. How-
ever, in 1995 productivity in the industrial sector was below 30 percent of the EU level for 
all Central Eastern European countries (Bijsterbosch and Kolasa 2009). It is rather likely that 
the figures in the 1990s already include a significant catch-up in productivity. For a detailed 
analysis of the cases of the Czech Republic and Hungary in the early 1990s see Hitchens et 
al. (1995). 
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technologies, to provide training and coaching of employees on how to use the 
new technologies efficiently, as well as on how to manage firms under the 
conditions of a market economy. Such a comprehensive knowledge transfer 
could be obtained by sending South Korean and international experts to North 
Korea. Another approach to the necessary knowledge transfer could be the 
acquisition of North Korean firms by South Korean and foreign companies. 
The massive problems that are to be expected when transforming incumbent 
socialist firms call for policy measures that focus on new business formation. 
In this regard, it is important to distinguish between firms started by North 
Korean citizens and new subsidiaries established by firms from South Korea 
and other countries. As in the case of East Germany and other East European 
transition countries, the economic and functional elites of the communist regime 
can play a vital role as managers and entrepreneurs in a transforming North Ko-
rean economy (see also Best and Vogel 2016, as well as Martens 2016, both in 
this HSR Forum). Hence, attempts to marginalize these groups of people would 
hamper economic development because this would leave their knowledge and 
talent unused. For the same reason, a complete substitution of the managers of 
incumbent North Korean firms is not advisable. The East German experience also 
demonstrated that such a massive change in the management structure would 
hardly be possible since there was only a small share of qualified West Germans 
that were willing to assume management positions in Eastern firms beyond short 
term engagements.11 However, if former North Korean managers remain in the 
firms after transition, then it is crucial to also attract new external managers in 
order to ‘inject’ new knowledge required for realizing the necessary adjustment 
of organizational structure and routines, as well as to implement rapid changes 
of product portfolios and production technologies. 
Altogether, it is very likely that after the initial stages of transition, adjust-
ment processes will continue for an extended period of time regardless of 
whether the transition process is radical or gradual. Therefore, the North Kore-
an economy will be in long-term need of specific support.  
4.2  General Prerequisites of a Successful Transition of North Korea 
What might a transition policy in the case of a peaceful unification of the Kore-
an Peninsula look like? What should be a main focus of such a policy? 
The most important prerequisite for a successful transition is the existence 
of clear and appropriate institutional framework conditions. It can be expected 
that, as in the case of German unification, the formal institutions of a trans-
formed North Korea will be based on the formal institutions of the South (for a 
                                                             
11  These factors are potential reasons why management positions of many of the surviving 
East German incumbent firms were held by individuals who maintained similar roles during 
socialist times (e.g. Martens 2005). 
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further discussion of models of economic integration in Korea, see Yang 2014). 
It may, of course, be reasonable to have temporary special regulations in the 
North as well.12 
Regardless of whether or not institutional changes take place in a shock-like 
manner as in the case of Germany, it is crucial to settle the regulation of prop-
erty rights from the very beginning. In this regard, there are mainly two prob-
lems. Namely, the privatization of incumbent firms and restitution claims of 
expropriated firm owners. In East Germany, investigating and verifying restitu-
tion claims was quite a lengthy process that, in many cases, led to delays in the 
restructuring of firms.13 The restitution policy also turned out to be problematic 
because not all of the former owners and their inheritors had appropriate con-
cepts for successfully restructuring the claimed businesses. As a reaction to 
these problems the German government later adopted an “investment-plan-
first” policy. According to this policy firms were not restituted to former own-
ers if another investor had a more compelling strategy and investment plan for 
restructuring the firm. In these cases former owners were financially compen-
sated.14 Based on these experiences we believe that implementing an “invest-
ment-plan-first” policy right from the beginning would be conducive for accel-
erating the conversion of the former socialist firms. Restitution should play 
only a rather minor role. 
Another bottleneck in the East German transition was the massive capital 
demand to modernize former state-owned enterprises and to launch new firms. 
Due to the poor economic conditions of the socialist system and low incentives 
for savings, the required capital could hardly be obtained from East German 
sources. Most presumably this will also apply to the case of North Korea. In 
order to attract the necessary capital it may be important to provide reasonable 
access for international investors. 
Since a transformation of the North Korean economy involves radical inno-
vation in many regards, there is presumably a tremendous need for increasing 
R&D activities, particularly in firms. In this regard, a more or less complete 
reorganization of the country’s innovation system may be required. The available 
information on science and technology illustrates its negligible role in the current 
North Korean economy (Frank et al. 2012, ch. 5.5.). 
Investment in physical infrastructure (e.g., streets, railways, and telecom-
munication) plays an important role for firms to obtain access to extra-regional 
and international markets. Last but not least, courses in management and busi-
ness administration should be part of the curricula of schools, universities and 
                                                             
12  It might be worthwhile to investigate whether or not there are rules in North Korea that 
could be also useful in South Korea.  
13  These problems of restitution in the privatization process are also vividly described by 
Blacksell et al. (1996). 
14  For details on the law dealing with restitution claims, see Shingleton et al. (1991). 
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also in on-the-job training programs in order to familiarize employees, espe-
cially those in leading positions, with the requirements of managing and run-
ning a company in a market economy. 
4.3  Policy Options to Support Incumbent Enterprises 
With regard to incumbent socialist enterprises it is of primary importance to 
investigate whether or not restructuring is a viable option. In quite a number of 
cases, the costs of adjusting organizational structures and production technolo-
gies may be much higher than the benefits of artificially keeping the enterprises 
alive. In the case of East Germany, the public privatization agency, THA, con-
ducted an ex ante rating of single firms with respect to the chances of success-
ful restructuring (for details, see Treuhand-Dokumentation 1994). A similar 
procedure could be fruitful in the case of a North Korean transition in order to 
identify firms that have sufficient capabilities to manage a successful transition. 
After such an evaluation, policy measures should focus on supporting these 
promising incumbent firms in the adaptation their organizational structures and 
routines, modernization of production technologies and mastery of a functional 
integration into the Korean market economy and international value chains. 
Any such efforts require the involvement of external experts that have experi-
ence with restructuring and privatization. 
In the case of East Germany, the number of qualified personnel and external 
advisors that could be attracted for such a task varied across industries. One 
major obstacle was that candidates for such a position feared that a temporary 
engagement in East Germany could be harmful for their future careers. For this 
reason many employees of the privatization agency were either relatively 
young (which came along with a lack of industry experience), or relatively old. 
Actors in the middle of their careers could hardly be attracted to engage in the 
privatization process (for details, see Seibel 2005, 171-85). Based on this expe-
rience it is crucial to create an incentive system that makes it attractive for 
experts and mid-career managers to get involved in the privatization of North 
Korean companies. At the same time, there should be incentives for South 
Korean companies to allow their employees temporary leaves in order to en-
gage in the North Korean transition process.  
When designing respective policy measures, it is critical to take into account 
several conflicts of interest. On the one hand, policy makers are interested in a 
prospering North Korean economy. On the other hand, the same policy makers 
depend, to some degree, on the goodwill of the South Korean elites who are not 
necessarily interested in the emergence of potential North Korean competitors 
over the course of an economically successful transition. Attracting direct 
foreign investment and being open to an engagement of foreign companies 
could be suitable approaches to counter these types of conflicts (for details 
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regarding the current international integration of the South Korean economy 
see Eichengreen et al. 2012).  
There are different measures to enhance competitiveness and capabilities of 
incumbent firms. However, it would be misleading to expect too much from 
restructuring these firms since it is very likely that many of them can hardly be 
made profitable at plausible costs. A sustainable economic development of 
North Korea cannot only rely on transforming former state-owned enterprises. 
It is probably much more important to promote entrepreneurship in order to 
achieve growth. 
4.4  Promoting New Firm Formation and Entrepreneurship  
The experience from the German transition demonstrates that formal institu-
tions play a pivotal role in new firm formation. Therefore, just as the design of 
the institutional framework is of crucial importance for the level of productive 
entrepreneurship in North Korea today, any new design in a unified Korea will 
continue to be decisive. If the Korean Peninsula undergoes a reunification and 
subsequent transition process similar to that experienced in Germany, it can be 
expected that the formal institutions of South Korea will be introduced in the 
northern part of the unified country. Hence, the question how “entrepreneur-
ship-friendly” are South Korea’s existing formal institutions becomes most 
relevant. Will South Korea’s current institutional framework support a bottom-
up transformation of the North Korean economy?  
The most recent country report of the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor 
(GEM) classifies South Korea as entrepreneurship-facilitating because of the 
availability and quality of physical infrastructures (e.g., industrial real estate, 
telecommunication, and transportation), cultural and social norms and values 
and low market entry barriers. Entrepreneurship-inhibiting factors include a 
lack of financial support for start-ups, little entrepreneurship education in 
schools and universities and poor availability of services that support entrepre-
neurial activity such as coaching, legal advice, and accounting (GEM 2013). 
South Korea is assigned to the group of innovation-driven economies which 
are characterized by high shares of the gross domestic product (GDP) spent for 
R&D. Comparisons of the level of start-up activities with other innovation-driven 
economies shows South Korea in the lower ranks (GEM 2014, 35). According to 
the Global Entrepreneurship and Development Index (GEDI) (see Acs, Szerb, 
and Autio 2016) Korea ranks rather high in human capital and innovation but 
relatively low with regard to competition and internationalization. 
It is not sufficient for policy measures to simply implement entrepreneur-
ship-friendly laws and regulations that aims at fostering new business for-
mation (policy layer); it must also try to stimulate a culture of entrepreneurship 
that is characterized by widespread acceptance of self-employment in the popu-
lation (normative-cognitive layer). Measures at the policy layer are: 
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-  Entrepreneurship-friendly laws and regulations which reduce barriers 
and obstacles hampering new firm creation. Examples are avoidance of 
unnecessary market entry barriers as well as developing an insolvency 
law tuned to the needs of young firms. 
- A clear-cut definition of property rights. In East Germany, for example, 
new firms in the early stage of transition faced the problem of finding 
production sites since property rights of real estate were unclear. 
- Development of an entrepreneurship facilitating supporting network like 
the creation of service centers for start-ups (e.g., coaching, incubators, 
business angels network) but also availability and provision of venture 
capital.  
In the case of North Korea it is safe to assume that there is an enormous need 
for action with respect to establishing entrepreneurship-facilitating framework 
conditions. Therefore, start-up coaching and the establishment of supporting 
networks should be given a high priority. Founders can be supported by offer-
ing training in the “classical” aspects of managing an entrepreneurial venture 
(e.g., business strategy, marketing, finance), as well as offering courses on 
general economic principles and the functioning of a market economy. 
Measures addressing the normative cognitive layer represent an important 
building bloc of a comprehensive entrepreneurship policy approach while also 
complementing policies focused on formal regulations. Promoting the social 
acceptance of the market economy system and entrepreneurship is one such 
complementary initiative. Another example includes measures to develop en-
trepreneurial values (e.g., strive for independence, willingness to assume risks) 
among the population.15 The transition experience in East Germany and Eastern 
Europe shows that lacking social acceptance of entrepreneurship was a severe 
stumbling block for the development of a vital private sector in the first years 
of transition. The effects of the socialist legacy on norms and values can persist 
despite radical changes in the formal institutional framework and can influence 
the effectiveness of new legislation (for details, see also Grusevaja 2005). These 
experiences teach us that even the most entrepreneurship-facilitating framework 
of formal institutions can be undermined if these are not backed up by measures 
that aim at promoting entrepreneurial values among the population.  
One way to stimulate social acceptance of entrepreneurship is by boosting 
the effectiveness of entrepreneurial role models. The empirical evidence shows 
that social contact with entrepreneurs has a positive effect on the choice of self-
employment as an occupation (Bosma et al. 2012). The underlying mechanisms 
are (1) a demonstration effect and (2) a peer effect. Observing successful entre-
preneurs in the social/local environment fosters learning about entrepreneurial 
                                                             
15  For further material on the psychological challenges of transition, see Silbereisen (2016, in 
this HSR Forum). 
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tasks and capabilities. At the same time, having entrepreneurial peers increases 
the likelihood of perceiving entrepreneurship as a viable career option. Since 
entrepreneurial role models play such an important role, the effectiveness of 
policy programs to enhance entrepreneurial skills and capabilities (e.g., busi-
ness plan competitions) should increase with the presence of successful entre-
preneurs. 
Another way of fostering social acceptance of entrepreneurs is the portrayal 
of successful entrepreneurs in the media. In areas where such role models are 
lacking it might be helpful to reference local entrepreneurial role models from 
the past, if available. Furthermore, policy measures addressing the normative 
cognitive layer should be tailored to region-specific needs. In areas where 
social acceptance of entrepreneurship is already relatively high fewer efforts 
are required than in places that have a lack thereof.16 Wether this is the case in 
North Korea is an open because of the increasing number of small traders and 
the emergence of a “marketplace economy” (jangmadang economy) that began 
in the mid-1990s. These developments might be helpful in establishing social 
acceptance of entrepreneurial behavior after a regime switch. However, a fair 
amount of these private sector activities in North Korea are obviously associat-
ed with the “personal enrichment of the upper classes” (Park and Choi 2014, 
49-54). This may hamper social acceptance of entrepreneurship in the general 
population.17 
For the North Korean economy as a whole, it is crucial to establish clear in-
stitutional rules, entrepreneurship-friendly laws for trade and commerce, as 
well as an appropriate design for industrial and labor relations. In this respect, 
it might make sense to create special rules for new firms (e.g., with regard to 
labor regulation). Education policies can play their part by integrating entre-
preneurship education in school and university curricula. Another important 
building bloc is ensuring the availability of financial resources. 
It is important that entrepreneurship policy has a clear regional focus. Any 
measure should be tailored according to region-specific needs.18 One crucial 
regional factor that should be considered is the socio-demographic composition 
of the local population with regard to age, qualification, and employment histo-
                                                             
16  Since the population in the special economic areas of North Korea (e.g., Kaesong, Kumgang-
San) already has direct contact with South Korean private sector companies, it is likely that 
that the social acceptance of a market economy and of entrepreneurship in these regions is 
relatively high as compared to other parts of the country. 
17  Apart from small traders, there are a lot of informal food-related household economic 
activities such as gardening and raising live stocks. In accordance to recent population cen-
suses, 84 percent of all North Koreans above the age of 16 years are involved in such activi-
ties (Lee 2014).  
18  For a more detailed exposition of the advantages of decentralized policy-making based on 
evidence from the East German transformation process, see Holtmann and Rademacher 
(2016, in this HSR Forum). 
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ry. It is likely that older working age people will find it particularly difficult to 
adopt an entrepreneurial attitude. Empirical evidence from East Germany 
(Wyrwich 2013) shows that even 15 years after German re-unification older 
East Germans are less likely to be self-employed when compared to their West 
German peers. This pattern can be explained by both the effect of socialism on 
one’s mind-set and a devaluation of labor market experience acquired in social-
ism. According to these results, one should expect that North Korean regions 
with a relatively high share of older people will exhibit a relatively low level of 
entrepreneurship. North Korean regions may also have different initial econom-
ic conditions that may influence the level and scope of entrepreneurial activi-
ties. There are indeed significant differences in living standards between 
Pyongyang and other North Korean provinces (e.g., Lee 2012). 
Similar to the developments in East Germany (Fritsch et al. 2014), it is like-
ly that those North Korean regions with a pre-socialist tradition in entrepre-
neurship will have an above-average level of start-up activity if there is further 
liberalization of private sector economic activity. It is also likely that these 
regions will master the transition challenge comparatively well. Nevertheless, 
due to the pronounced communist indoctrination in North Korea it is unclear 
how strong the effect of potential entrepreneurship culture pre-dating com-
munism might still be. 
5.  Concluding Remarks: The Main Policy Lessons 
Our paper draws on the experiences and knowledge gained from the transition 
processes that occurred in East Germany after the reunification of East and 
West Germany and applies them to what might be expected in North Korea if 
the Korean Peninsula undergoes a similar reunification. The example of post-
transition East Germany clearly shows that industrial restructuring over the 
course of transition from a socialist centrally planned economy towards a mar-
ket economy depends especially on new firm formation. The role of restruc-
tured former state-owned enterprises in terms of employment and job creation 
is rather marginal. In East Germany, new firms clearly created the bulk share of 
new jobs. This is remarkable given that there have been no special policy pro-
grams for stimulating entrepreneurship in the 1990s. In contrast to the German 
case, policy should put a special focus on new business formation and self-
employment right from the beginning in order to support the population in 
using their skills, knowledge and creativity in an economically productive way. 
The specific design of an institutional framework plays a critical role for a 
successful bottom-up transformation via start-up activity. This refers especially 
to formal rules such as business, labor, and competition law. Furthermore, 
norms and values of the population with regard to the social acceptance of 
entrepreneurs are pivotal. Another lesson from East Germany is that many of 
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the new entrepreneurs and managers of incumbent enterprises already held 
leading positions during socialist regime. Accordingly, it is likely that a com-
plete exchange of the economic elites in the case of a North Korean transition 
might cause a severe reduction of the available entrepreneurial potential.  
Any transition policy should be tuned to the different regional contexts 
across North Korea. Some North Korean regions might have an entrepreneurial 
history pre-dating the communist regime, and as such are certainly not starting 
from scratch. Potential regional differences in existing entrepreneurship cul-
tures and general demographics should not be ignored by policy makers. Entre-
preneurship policy needs a long-term orientation that avoids jeopardizing the 
market selection processes by using special subsidies or a short-term oriented 
“pick-the-winners” strategy. 
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